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This article investigates pardoning and harm in England and Wales in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, laying the foundations for zemiological accounts of pardoning. 
Here, a broadly defined zemiological notion of social harm is combined with thinking 
about cultural harm from both within and outside zemiology and, in so doing, 
zemiological thinking is further developed. Cultural harm is considered alongside other 
forms of social harm because, in the context of pardoning at least, it is not productive to 
separate hurts, even were this entirely possible.  
 
In this perspective, amongst other things, pardoning is identified as recognising 
and addressing harm, as well as failing and being reluctant to address harm and also as 
playing a role in creating and sustaining a climate in which harm happens and is allowed 
to continue. Along the way, the article provides a brief, partial sketch of the relationship 
between pardoning and appeals - because appeals are impossible to exclude from 
discussions of pardoning in this period. In doing so, existing zemiological work on appeals 
is also drawn upon and developed.  
 
The article begins by looking at harm. Next it briefly reflects on methods, moving 
on to introduce pardoning, before focusing on pardoning and harm. Here the argument 
begins by suggesting that pardoning can address and to some degree rectify harm 
(although there are suggestions along the way that pardoning should not be seen as an 
entirely straightforwardly benevolent device), then moves on to look at pardoning and 
the ways in which pardons are deployed more critically, focusing on harm. I conclude by 





Before addressing pardoning, it is important to set out the zemiological perspective 
adopted here. Following the title of the 2004 collection edited by Paddy Hillyard, 
Christina Pantazis, Steve Tombs and Dave Gordon, which marked the beginnings of the 
zemiological turn in social sciences, zemiology is taken to be a field of study which lies 
Beyond Criminology and is concerned with the study of avoidable social harms.2 As such, 
 
1 I would like to thank the following for their comments on my ideas and/or draft versions of this 
article: Dr Michael Ashworth; Professor Paddy Hillyard; Dave Orr; Dr Tanya Palmer; Professor 
Christina Pantazis; Professor Gwen Seabourne; Dr Clare Torrible;, those who attended my talks 
at the Radical History Festival in April 2018 and the University of Bristol Law School Crime, 
Medical and Family Law Primary Unit in December 2018. 
2 It is now well enough established as a discipline to have, for example, its first professor (special 
issue co-editor, Christina Pantazis), an entry in the Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Hillyard and 
Tombs, 2017)  as well as a Wikipedia page (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zemiology). Now 
zemiology poses alternatives to criminology and challenges the discipline for its limited 
(and limiting) focus on crime (which is recognised to be a human construction). More 
broadly, zemiology is taken to be a field which has a radical agenda and politics.  
 
The study of avoidable social harm allows the thinker to look both inside and 
outside the fuzzy and shifting boundaries of what is (in theory or in practice) criminal. It 
allows for the study of a wide range of harms, including those that have attracted the 
attention of criminal law, those which have not and those harms which are produced by 
criminal law and the criminal justice system of which it forms a part. To date zemiological 
studies of harm have, for example, looked at gender, the state, murder, migration and the 
workplace.  
 
Following Hillyard and Tombs in 2004, harm is not precisely defined in this article, 
as insisting on a precise meaning risks limiting the concept - and missing harm. Broadly 
speaking though, I take as my starting point the everyday meaning of harm - as damage, 
injury, hurt, destruction. According to Hillyard and Tombs, social harm would include 
emotional, psychological, physical and financial harms as well as, significantly for present 
purposes, harm to ‘cultural safety’, which they suggested might involve restriction of 
access to cultural resources (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004: 20).  
 
My work has focused upon zemiology before. Building on gender and sexualities 
scholarship3 in 2004 ‘Heterosexuality as Harm: Fitting in’ (Beyond Criminology, chapter 
4) developed ‘[t]he idea that constructions of heterosexuality can inflict harm’ (Bibbings, 
2004: 217) by examining the contexts of medicine and education. In doing so, the chapter 
explored the harms caused by the idea of ‘real sex’ and of the ‘natural’ (Bibbings, 2004: 
219-20). It highlighted the effects of heterosexuality’s binary thinking, its dimorphic and 
hierarchical ontology; which separates men and women, labels bodies either male or 
female, seeing them as passive or active and which gives priority to men. For instance, 
the privileging of the heterosexual family was identified as causing harm to individuals 
and families who in various respects failed to fit this mould (Bibbings, 2004: 227-8). This 
study of social harm was concerned with harm fostered by a cluster of ideas associated 
with heterosexuality which had a particular cultural currency. Or to put it another way, it 
was argued that ideas circulating in a particular cultural context created and sustained 
an environment where harm was more likely to be caused to people who variously did 
not ‘fit in’. So, a form of cultural harm was explored in this paper and this thinking is taken 
forward here.  
 
Whilst an embryonic notion of cultural harm as a form of social harm was taken to 
be within the purview of zemiology in Beyond Criminology, the concept is thought to have 
emerged within campaigns and studies concerned with harms perpetrated upon 
Aboriginal peoples (Garner and Elvines, 2014: 2).4 In 2002 an incredibly powerful and 
personal paper by Lorena Sekwan Fontaine described the ‘legacy of cultural harm’ in 
relation to the Indian Residential School system in Canada, for example.5 Up until the late 
 
conference papers and articles discuss zemiology and books have consciously sought to mark out 
the field - Pemberton, 2016; Boukli and Kotzé, 2018. 
3 Including work by Rich, 1980; Jeffries, 1990; Wittig, 1992. 
4 I am grateful to Dr Tanya Palmer for sharing her detective work and thoughts on this work and 
its link to feminist scholarship.  
5 On the history of the Schools see especially Molloy, 1999.  
twentieth century children were removed from their families, homes and communities 
and placed in ‘a foreign and abusive environment created to eliminate their culture’ 
(Fontaine, 2002) – or, in the words of a government official in the early 1900s, in order 
to rid Canada of its ‘Indian problem’ by assimilation (quoted by Fontaine, 2002). This was 
an attempt to bring about ‘cultural extinguishment’ (Fontaine, 2002). Moreover, for some 
the School system was part of a calculated policy of cultural and physical genocide 
(Chrisjohn and Young with Maraun, 1997).   
 
For Fontaine, the ‘cultural racism’ of the School era resulted not only in immediate 
cultural harm but also left a ‘legacy of cultural harm’ (Fontaine, 2002). Fontaine explained 
this in terms of her own family. Her grandfather, parents, aunts, uncles and mother had 
all been taken away from their communities, their homes, separated from relations, ill-
treated and abused within the Schools. Now her generation were affected, despite the fact 
they grew up after the last School had closed (Fontaine, 2002). Research highlights this 
‘Third Generation - Intergenerational Cultural Harm’ (Fontane, 2002), which includes 
loss of language, identity and culture, alcohol and drug abuse, violence and high suicide 
rates (see further: MacDonald and Steenbeek, 2015; Bombay et al, 2014; Elias et al, 2012). 
Moreover, some studies point to ‘genocidal outcomes, in terms of intergenerational 
trauma and cultural disintegration’ (MacDonald and Hudson, 2012: 428). 
 
So here cultural harm relates to damage done to the culture of a People and it has 
a legacy. It impacts upon individuals, families and communities, in the past, in the present 
and, without significant reparative action, will continue to do so.6 The use of cultural harm 
in this context is very specific and applying the notion elsewhere requires care. In this 
article I draw upon the idea of harm having a legacy. In addition, this work helped inform 
the way in which I look at cultural harm here.   
 
In England and Wales feminist scholarship and campaigning on pornography has 
deployed the idea of cultural harm. In 2009 feminist lawyers Clare McGlynn and Erica 
Rackley criticised Government approaches to pornography and argued for the 
criminalisation of extreme pornography and, in particular, ‘rape pornography’ 
(pornographic images of rape). In doing so, they tried to move beyond direct cause and 
effects thinking (that pornography causes sexual violence towards women), arguing 
instead that ‘extreme pornography may contribute to a cultural context in which violent 
sexual activity is encouraged or legitimated, what we would call a form of “cultural 
harm”.’ (McGlynn and Rackley, 2009: 256-257) So it might be said that harm is done to 
the cultural context by pornography, creating an environment where the harm of sexual 
violence is more likely and is less likely to be recognised as harm or to be taken seriously, 
including by the criminal justice system – and, in this view, pornography may cause 
indirect harm (see especially McGlynn and Rackley, 2009: 257-8).7  
 
Subsequently Tanya Palmer revisited McGlynn and Rackley’s work in order to 
develop and generalise their concept of cultural harm and then to explore whether 
cultural harm arguments worked in relation to rape pornography and its criminalisation 
(Palmer, 2018). It is the former part of her writing which concerns us here. In seeking to 
 
6 See further, for example: James, 2012; Canadian Government ‘Delivering on Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Calls to Action’ webpages.  
7 See also, in particular, McGlynn and Rackley, 2014, 2018. They also raised this idea a little earlier 
in 2007 (681-2). 
more precisely define cultural harm, her starting point was that it is ‘a type of harm which 
manifests in the normalisation of attitudes and practices deemed negative’, with 
‘normalisation’ defined as ‘a process by which attitudes, practices and/or ways of being 
become accepted as routine, unremarkable or at least understandable aspects of 
everyday life’ (Palmer, 2018: 39). In this model ‘human action is shaped by, but not 
entirely determined by, the actor’s cultural milieu’ (Palmer, 2018: 40). Palmer deploys 
Nicola Gavey’s idea of the ‘cultural scaffolding of rape’ (Gavey, 2005) to expand upon this 
thinking. Here common place ideas about ‘normative sexual relations’, such as men’s 
supposed need for sex versus women’s use of sex instrumentally to sustain relationships, 
were conceived of as having the effect of both ‘mak[ing] rape easier to perpetrate and 
harder to address’ (Palmer, 2018: 40). Or, as Gavey phrased it, ‘persistently gendered 
patterns of heterosexuality’ form the cultural scaffolding of rape, with the ‘naturalization 
of women’s passivity and men’s aggressive pursuit of sex’ letting ‘rape slip by unnoticed 
as just part and parcel of normal sex’ (Gavey, 2005: 214). Gavey’s focuses in on harmful 
ideas in a similar way to my heterosexuality as harm argument, suggesting that one might 
look at ideas which can provide support for harm.8 
 
Palmer shaped and drew together these accounts in order to argue that cultural 
harm in general terms ‘refers to the development of cultural resources which underpin 
harmful interactions with others’ (Palmer, 2018: 1). By way of a helpful illustration she 
considered the 2016 European Union referendum, where Leave texts ‘served to 
normalise racist and anti-immigration attitudes through the messages conveyed’, 
focusing upon white working-class Britons as victims and immigrants as the threat. She 
explained that ‘[c]umulatively, these texts contribute to the cultural scaffolding which 
supports the manifestation of racism and xenophobia in material harms such as 
discrimination and hate crime’ (Palmer, 2018: 41).  
 
Writing from within zemiology, Alex Dymock’s work (2018) also considered 
McGlynn and Rackley’s arguments. She highlighted, amongst other things, the fact that 
their use of cultural harm was (successfully) deployed in order to criminalise individuals 
rather than to focus upon structural harms – and in doing so played into the ‘war on 
crime’ (Dymock, 2018:179). In contrast, zemiological perspectives tend, amongst other 
things, to ‘identify the harms of continual reliance on criminalisation as a solution to 
social problems’ (Dymock, 2018: 168). With this in mind, the need to adopt a careful 
approach to the uses to which zemiological accounts might be put – and of the possible 
implications and effects of calling something harmful – underlies the consideration of 
pardoning here. Also, Dymock’s reminder about structural harm is crucial to the analysis 
below.  
 
This article draws together and utilises these ideas about different forms of social 
harm, including cultural harm, in order to consider pardoning and harm.9 It does so 
 
8 So existing work on rape narratives or myths might usefully be further explored in this context. 
See, for example: Smith and Skinner, 2017; Gurnham, 2018. 
9 There is other important work on cultural harm which does not figure here but warrants a 
mention. In particular, Lois Presser’s work  asks why we harm, arguing, for example, that we harm 
as a consequence of ‘cultural logics, typically in the form of stories, that reduce the target of harm 
and conjure ourselves as both authorized to harm and powerless not to.’ (Presser, 2013: 109). 
Whilst connections might be developed between Presser’s work and this study of pardoning - and 
without adopting a rigid and limiting definition of harm and without being too concerned 
to separate out that which might be considered cultural from other forms of harm – harm 
matters however we might opt to categorise it. In addition, separating out harms is not 
always possible; financial and emotional harm can occur as the result of the same event 
or culturally prevalent idea, for example. Moreover, as this is an investigation of 
pardoning and harm, the analysis looks not only at the harm that can be associated with 





This article forms a small part of a project on the Shot at Dawn Campaign which 
eventually led to the pardoning of men executed for military offences by the British 
military during World War One (see section 359 Armed Forces Act 2006). It is informed 
by the work so far undertaken for this project, including interviews with some of the 
campaigners, but draws mostly upon initial investigations into the use and nature of 
pardoning. So, pardoning in relation to military cases is considered alongside pardoning 
in the context of the civilian criminal justice system.  
 
Pardoning is jurisdictionally specific. Consequently, although scholarship relating 
to other legal systems was considered within the research process, this article only 
considers pardoning in the UK. More specifically, the focus is on England and Wales. 
Scotland is not specifically considered because of its distinct criminal justice system. 
Ireland (which was part of the UK at the beginning of the period under consideration) 
and Northern Ireland are not completely excluded but are only briefly alluded to here 
because exploring the political context and the use of pardoning on the island was far too 
large a task for the present paper – this is something to which I will return in the 
conclusion below.  
 
In terms of the time period, starting in the early twentieth century meant the focus 
was on a key moment when criminal appeals came into being and this meant that some 
tentative explorations of the relationship between the two devices (pardons and appeals) 
could be attempted. Also, as is discussed below, the use of pardoning changed once there 
was a criminal appeal court, so the 1900s were a key turning point in the history of 
pardoning.  
 
Pardoning in the form of remissions of sentence (which authorise the early release 
of a prisoner) was, for the most part, not considered in order to narrow the focus, neither 
were pardons granted as a reward for helping the authorities or on medical or 
compassionate grounds. Pre-conviction pardons were also excluded.10 I did not attempt 
to investigate all relevant pardoning cases in the period, focusing instead on a few key 
and high-profile instances of pardoning which figured prominently in the relevant 
literatures. This means that the current article is exploratory and provisional, inviting 
further investigation.  
 
thinking about stories about and around pardoning could be particularly productive - the present 
project has more points of contact with the scholarship already noted.  
10 On pre-conviction pardons see Boyes (1861). Other possible types of pardoning are sometimes 
referred to but these too are excluded from consideration here. See, for example, Rubin, 2007: ftn 
18.  
 
I reviewed literature on the recent history of pardoning in England and Wales as 
well as studying cases of pardoning and associated materials, including work on 
zemiology, on harm and on appeals. To a degree the analysis adopted legal and socio-legal 
methods in terms of reading cases and statutes. More generally, as opposed to methods 
of analysis in social science research and in keeping with my work as a historian, I have 
used what I have previously referred to as a literary-historical approach, involving 
reading, thinking and identifying key ideas – and more reading, thinking and identifying, 
as well as writing (Bibbings, 2004: 5-6). In reading cases, commentaries and other 
materials I was alert to harms and to selecting material which might help develop a 
zemiological analysis of pardoning. In terms of a research question, I adopted the 





Pardoning can be royal or statutory. A royal pardon (the royal prerogative of mercy) can 
take different forms. The types focused on here are ‘free’ (unconditional) and 
‘conditional’ pardons. They are granted by the monarch on the advice of ministers – or, 
more precisely, a principle Secretary of State (Ministry of Justice, 2009, paras 54-5). A free 
royal pardon is said to remove the consequences of the conviction in question, but it does 
not undo it – the idea being that only a court can quash a conviction. So, the pardonee 
remains convicted but is no longer meant to feel the negative effects of their conviction 
(in terms of legal disqualifications, for example - see Foster [1985] 130). Conventionally, 
free pardoning is not supposed to be about forgiveness because it was said that a free 
royal pardon could only be granted to the technically and morally innocent (the subject 
of a pardon had to have ‘clean hands’),11 meaning that there was nothing to forgive. 
However, its use was not always depicted in this way12 and, indeed, has not always been 
confined to such cases. Moreover, as we shall see, free pardoning seems no longer 
necessarily to be tied to this kind of thinking at all. In contrast, at present a successful 
appeal against conviction to the Court of Appeal does not require innocence,13 instead the 
court enquires into the ‘safety’ of the conviction.14  Conditional royal pardons solely relate 
to sentence, whereby a lesser punishment is substituted on the condition that the 
convicted person serve it (in the past a death sentence might be replaced by 
imprisonment, for example). Here both the conviction and its effects stand. By way of 
comparison, a successful sentencing appeal will vary the sentence.  
 
A statutory pardon is simply a pardon granted by an Act of Parliament. This means 
that it could take a very wide variety of forms. For example, the statutory pardon of the 
men shot at dawn did not remove either their convictions or their sentences and the 
 
11 For examples of mention of the ‘clean hands doctrine’ in the context of free pardoning 
recommendations see, for example, Rubin, 2007: 49, 50, 54, 55-6. 
12 For example, see an 1847 memorandum quoted in Bentley [1994] 357 which mentions ‘a doubt 
of guilt’. 
13 On innocence and appeals, see especially: Roberts, 2003; Quirk, 2007.  
14 See Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s 2, as amended by Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s 2(1) (a). This applies to 
appeals to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal from the Crown Court. There is an 
automatic right of appeal in relation to convictions in the magistrates’ courts but here the appeal 
takes the form of a retrial (Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, s 108). 
possibility of a royal pardon of some sort being granted at some future date was left open. 
Statutory pardoning can also be difficult to identify – for instance, in the context of 
Northern Ireland there is room for argument as to whether Good Friday Agreement 
remissions of sentences provided for by the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 
constitute a form of pardoning (compare Mulvihill, 2001 with McEvoy et al, 2015, for 
example). To complicate things further in terms of the different forms of pardon, as the 
shot at dawn example demonstrates, now a pardon (royal or statutory) can be granted 
posthumously.  
 
The legal context in which pardoning takes place has altered somewhat over the 
period studied here and some of these changes have had a direct impact upon pardoning. 
In the very early years of the twentieth century there was no possibility of an appeal 
following a criminal conviction as there was no criminal court of appeal until the 1907 
Criminal Appeal Act set up the then Court of Criminal Appeal, following worries 
occasioned by two pardoning cases (one of which was that of Adolf Beck – see further 
below).15 Ninety or so years later the role of the prerogative of mercy was greatly reduced 
as a consequence of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. This measure resulted from concerns 
over miscarriage cases, including that of the Birmingham Six (McIlkenny; Hill; Power; 
Walker; Hunter; Callaghan [1992]). It created a new body, the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC), with powers to refer convictions in criminal courts to the Criminal 
Division of the Court of Appeal when normal rights of appeal had been exhausted.  
 
The CCRC was established in April 1997. In addition to its role in relation to 
appeals, where a royal pardon was being considered it could be asked to assist the 
Secretary of State (1995 Act section 16).16 Part of the thinking in relation to the provisions 
regarding appeals and pardons was to limit executive incursions into judicial matters; 
enquiring into possible injustices, abuses and mistakes was a matter for an independent 
body and undoing sentences or convictions handed down by the courts was a matter for 
the judiciary. Consequently, the use of royal pardons, was likely to be reduced by the Act 
(see Halsbury’s 20 (2014) 3, (4) 139).  
 
In contrast, the use of statutory pardons has had something of a resurgence in the 
twenty-first century, with the pardoning of groups of men. Thousands have been 
pardoned as a consequence of just two Acts of Parliament; the men who were shot at 
dawn and men convicted in relation to consensual sexual activities under homosexual 
offences which no longer exist (see below). 
 
So royal and statutory pardons are very different. Yet some similar things can be 
said about them.17 Moreover, as the above begins to suggest, the relationship between 
pardoning and appeals is, at least, an interesting one. Appeals under the ordinary system 
and via the CCRC exist at the very end of the criminal justice system. The CCRC role, as an 
independent body lies outside the criminal justice system, although it is somewhat 
constrained by the need to predict how the Court of Appeal might view the case in 
 
15 Prior to this a trial judge could refer a question of law to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved 
but only where there had been a conviction. See Bibbings, 2014: 15-16. 
16 See further Quirk, 2009: 651. 
17 In order to do so, however, some broad generalisations and simplifications are deployed here - 
and much is left out, meaning that there is further work to be done on pardoning and harm 
beyond the present article.   
deciding which cases to refer.18 Pardoning, whether royal or statutory, comes at or 
towards the end of a criminal matter but is handed down by very different means and has 
different effects to an appeal. In addition, pardoning, especially by the sovereign, is, it 
might be said, more splendid, more glamourous, less ordinary, as compared with the 
decision of a court, perhaps even if it is the Court of Appeal hearing a case referred by the 
CCRC. And these devices (pardons and appeals) along with the Commission, exist in a 
complex relationship of interconnection and separation.   
 
 
Pardoning and Harm 
 
How then does harm relate to pardoning? As already suggested, the types of circumstance 
in which a pardon can be granted are by no means clearly bounded and pardoning can 
take various forms. However, at the most basic level, where granted, a pardon of the kinds 
under consideration here could be said to represent a recognition of and a response to 
harms of conviction and/or sentencing. These are harms in which the criminal justice 
system is at least involved or implicated if not the cause. Moreover, pardoning (to an 
extent) rectifies harm and can demonstrate a malleability in seeking to do so, meaning 
that it can be deployed when an appeal is not available and can be used in ways that go 
against what has previously been understood to be possible and permissible. Pardoning 
then does good. It mends, it remedies. It provides justice. In this analysis, far from being 
in some way conceived of as being concerned with cultural harm, pardoning might be 
said to be a positive societal or cultural force (and similar things might be said about 
appeals, although the latter are perhaps less grand, less shiny). It is crucial to 
acknowledge this; pardoning is hugely important to the pardoned, their families and 
descendants. Pardons are desperately sought after for good reason. 
 
Some pardoning cases relate to the innocent, the probably innocent and people 
convicted as a result of wrong-doing or errors within the criminal justice system. In other 
instances, such as the men convicted of criminal offences because they engaged in 
consensual gay sex, the harm comes from the attitudes of the time; or to put it another 
way, from the harmful effects of a cultural context which prioritised heterosexuality and 
tended to mistreat those perceived as failing to ‘fit in’ (or the scaffolding idea might be 
deployed here).  
 
The harms suffered by the pardoned relate to conviction and sentence as well as 
associated harms suffered as a consequence of conviction and sentencing. They map on 
to the social, physical, financial and psychological harms discussed by Michael Naughton 
in the context of ‘miscarriages of justice', by which he means both ordinary appeals 
(which follow the normal process) and appeals referred back to court outside the normal 
appeal process (cases such as the Birmingham Six) (see especially Naughton, 2004).19 
This list might be expanded, to include emotional harm. The harms could include loss of 
reputation, loss of freedom, removal from family and friends, loss of livelihood or career, 
depression and, in capital cases of the past, loss of life at the hands of the state. All these 
things, however, harm not only the person concerned but also their family, their friends 
and the harm is not limited to the timescape in which a conviction and sentence take 
 
18  See, for example, Quirk, 2007: 764. 
19 Naughton’s output regarding miscarriages of justice is prolific. See Naughton website.   
place, rather it bleeds down the generations, meaning that, as Fontaine explained, harm 
leaves a legacy. Janet Booth, granddaughter of Private Harry Farr, who in 1916 was shot 
at dawn for the military offence of ‘misbehaving before the enemy in such a manner as to 
show cowardice’ despite having been diagnosed with shell shock (Putkowski and Sykes, 
1989: 121; Booth and White, 2017), powerfully conveys the harm felt in the past (by her 
mother and grandmother) and present (by herself and other family members, knowing 
of  Harry and his wife and child’s suffering). She also describes getting the news of his 
pardoning – her mother was ‘absolutely over the moon’ (see, for instance, Snow 
interview). As we shall see, a legacy of harm is felt by other pardoning and appeal case 
families.  
 
Sometimes pardons address harm where no other solution exists; they save the 
day – and pardons, of course, come from outside the criminal (and military) justice 
system, giving them a distinct and special role in relation to what might be described as 
the harms of the criminal (and military) justice system. Let us consider two instances 
where free royal pardons were granted in order to illustrate this idea of pardoning being 
the only possible remedy.  
 
Adolf Beck had been twice convicted of property offences involving deception, 
first in 1896, then in 1904. Subsequently it became clear that the real perpetrator was a 
man with more than a passing resemblance to Beck. However, he could not appeal as 
there was no criminal court of appeal at this time. There was a public campaign which 
attracted some popular support. As a result, two free royal pardons were granted in 1904 
and Beck received financial compensation (see Sweeney 2006; Sims, 1904). So, in Beck’s 
case, pardoning was filling in a gap in the criminal justice system by addressing the harm 
where there was no other means of doing so. 
 
Michael Shields20 was convicted of attempted murder. The assault upon which this 
was based happened in Varna in 2005 and Shields was convicted by a Bulgarian court – 
so the initial harm of conviction and sentence took place within a different criminal justice 
system, setting the case somewhat apart from the others considered here. New evidence 
subsequently emerged which meant his guilt was called into question (another man 
confessed). Attempts at appealing his conviction in Bulgaria were unsuccessful. Shields 
was then repatriated so that he might serve his sentence in the UK and there was nothing 
else to be done in terms of legal system remedies. The then Secretary of State for Justice, 
Jack Straw, was called upon to recommend a free pardon but refused on the basis of legal 
advice (it was said that the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 and the Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons 1983 prevented a pardon in Shields’s circumstances). The 
matter was then referred to the Administrative Court which ruled that the Secretary of 
State did have the power to recommend a pardon (Shields [2008]). As a consequence of 
this decision, Jack Straw recommended that Shields be granted a free royal pardon as he 
met the ‘very high test of moral and technical innocence’ (Naughton, 2009 and see Straw, 
2009). It was duly granted and he was released from prison (Gabbatt, 2009). So, in 
relation to both Shields and Beck, pardoning saved the day by offering some sort of harm 
remedy where there was nothing that could be done within the criminal justice system.21 
 
20 The factual detail here is drawn from Shields [2008]. 
21 In pardoning Shields it has also been argued that the territorial reach of pardoning was 
extended, which by both common law and international law was thought by some to be 
geographically bounded. See Bennion, 2009. 
 
A pardon can, of course, never entirely undo harm. In addition, there are specific 
ways in which different forms of pardoning only partially rectify harm. For instance, a 
conditional pardon only addresses sentence. Where it is awarded following a pardon, 
financial compensation can provide assistance but it cannot undo the past and it is not 
always forthcoming.22 In the case of a free pardon, the conviction stands. This means that, 
for some, obtaining a free pardon is not enough as a key part of the harm remains; if a 
person is innocent, then the least that is needed is a quashing of the conviction. For 
example, the campaign around the Alice Wheeldon case, currently led by her great-
granddaughter Chlo e Mason, wants an appeal against Wheeldon’s conviction for 
conspiracy to murder Prime Minister Lloyd George in 1917. A pardon is irrelevant as the 
charge against the state is that Wheeldon and her family were framed by a government 
agent (Alice Wheeldon campaign). In capital cases where the person or people convicted 
have been executed this need to quash the conviction can, unsurprisingly, be particularly 
acute – and here again we see the legacy of harm.   
 
In 1952 19-year-old Derek Bentley was convicted with 16-year-old Christopher 
Craig of the murder of Police Constable Sidney George Miles. The murder charge arose 
from events that played out on a warehouse roof. The young men were being chased by 
police, Craig had a gun, Bentley was armed with a knuckleduster. At one-point Bentley, 
who was described as ‘illiterate’ and ‘below average intelligence’ (Bentley [2001] 347), 
shouted ‘Let him have it, Chris’ (Bentley [2001] 308).  Bentley was arrested and then Craig 
shot Miles. Bentley’s guilt was founded on the fact that he was part of a joint criminal 
enterprise (namely warehouse-breaking), meaning he could potentially be held liable for 
offences which occurred during the enterprise (Bentley [2001] 308). Craig could not be 
sentenced to death because of his age, so was imprisoned.  Bentley received a death 
sentence and then appealed unsuccessfully against conviction. His only chance at this 
stage was for the question of a conditional pardon to be considered so that his life could 
be saved. The jury had recommended mercy, although the judge had not. The Home Office 
advice to the Home Secretary of the time was that a conditional pardon should be 
recommended. He, however, declined to do so. Bentley was, therefore, hanged in early 
1953 (for the history of the case see Bentley [1994] 354-6).   
 
Bentley’s sister’s long campaign for a posthumous pardon led in 1992 to Home 
Secretary Kenneth Clarke considering recommending a royal pardon but rejecting her 
plea. It is clear from his statements around this that he was addressing the possibility of 
a free pardon and his rejection was based upon the notion that such a pardon required 
moral and technical innocence (see Bentley [1994] 355-6). Iris Pamala Bentley, however, 
sought to challenge Clarke’s decision by bringing a judicial review (Bentley [1994]). Here 
the High Court decided that it had jurisdiction to look into a royal pardoning 
recommendation decision. The court considered not only the Home Secretary’s decision 
not to recommend a free pardon because of a question mark over innocence but also 
looked at his failure to consider a conditional pardon. In fact, the latter was the focus of 
the case, along with the issue of whether a posthumous conditional pardon could be 
granted. The court found that a posthumous conditional pardon should have been 
considered and that here the grant of a pardon would be a recognition of a mistake, 
namely that a reprieve should have been granted in 1953 so that the execution never 
 
22 Shields was released without monetary support. See Brown, 2010. 
happened (Bentley [1994]: 365). This was, however, seen as an exceptional case (Bentley 
[1994]: 366), meaning no floodgates would be opened should the Home Secretary decide 
to recommend such a pardon. 
 
As a result of this case, Clarke did indeed recommend a conditional royal pardon, 
which was granted in the summer of 2003. But there the matter did not rest. The family 
continued campaigning as the pardon was not enough – the original harm and its legacy 
remained. They now focused on the conviction, with an appeal rather than a pardon in 
mind. The case was sent to the newly created CCRC which decided to refer it to the Court 
of Appeal under section 9(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 – the procedure for appeals 
to be heard outside the normal appeal process. In 1998, over 40 years after he had been 
hanged, the Court quashed Bentley’s conviction (Bentley [2001]). In such unusual cases, 
where there is a long gap between the original trial and the appeal, the appellate judges 
undertake a potentially complex task. Here the court had to apply: the substantive law of 
murder as it was at the time of Bentley’s conviction; the contemporary common law on 
joint unlawful enterprise; and the conduct of the trial, direction to the jury and safety of 
the conviction were also to be judged according to modern standards (Bentley [2001]: 
310). In Bentley’s case, however, this did not cause the kinds of problems in terms of 
intellectual gymnastics and time-travelling which might be imagined occurring, as the 
focus was on the conduct of the trial by the judge, with the Court of Appeal making a 
number of findings including that ‘the summing-up as a whole had been such as to deny 
the appellant a fair trial which was the birthright of every British citizen’ (see Bentley 
[2001] 308 and generally).23 Hence the conviction could not stand - and the Court of 
Appeal felt that this should have been picked up by the then Court of Criminal Appeal in 
1953. (see Bentley [2001] 340; Rubin, 2007: 43)   
 
So, Derek Bentley was at last found to be not guilty of murder and the family were 
awarded financial compensation. His parents had died in the 1970s, his sister the year 
before the successful appeal, meaning her daughter, Maria Bentley-Dingwall, steered the 
final stages of the campaign. Here again we see how harm’s legacy can persist and be 
transmitted from person to person, with Bentley-Dingwall speaking emotionally of ‘the 
love of an uncle I’ve never had’ and describing his execution as murder (BBC, 2015).     
 
In 1950 Timothy Evans, who had reportedly received little education (BBC, 2010) 
but was described in legal proceedings as being ‘an impressionable man of below normal 
intelligence’ (Westlake [2004] 7), was tried for the murder of his daughter, Geraldine. 
Initially he confessed both to this crime and to the murder of his wife, Beryl, but he then 
retracted the former admission. He was convicted and hanged by the state, the Home 
Secretary of the day having declined to recommend a conditional pardon and prevent his 
death, despite recommendations of mercy from the jury. Evans, however, lived at 10 
Rillington Place with the chief prosecution witness in his case, John Christie. Christie was 
 
23 In addition they found that: he had given no direction to the jury on the standard of proof 
required to convict; his ‘direction on the treatment of police evidence could not be supported 
because … he had fallen into the pitfall of inviting the jury to approach the evidence on the 
assumption that police officers, because they were police officers, were likely to be accurate and 
reliable witnesses, and that the defendants, because they were defendants, were likely to be 
inaccurate and unreliable’; and the judge’s direction on the law and review of the evidence was not 
careful enough.  
subsequently found to be a serial killer, convicted of one murder and hanged in 1953 but 
not before he confessed to the murder of Evans’s wife (see Westlake [2004] 3-8).  
 
Following Christie’s execution there were calls for Evans to be pardoned, with 
prominent individuals24 and sections of the press involved but these efforts were initially 
unsuccessful for a number of reasons. In particular, there were doubts (some decades 
prior to the Bentley judicial review) that any kind of posthumous royal pardoning was 
possible (see, Rubin’s analysis, 2007: 51-2) and there were those who argued that ‘clean 
hands’ were required for a free pardon and disputed Evans’s technical and/or moral 
innocence.25 Despite resistance, in 1966 the Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, announced a 
free royal pardon. However, in doing so he by no means endorsed Evans’s innocence, 
explaining that, whilst it was at that point in time ‘impossible to establish the truth 
beyond doubt’ it was ‘more probable than not that Evans did not kill his daughter, for 
whose murder he was tried, convicted and executed.’ His justification for recommending 
a pardon despite acknowledging these issues around innocence was that it was not right 
to allow the conviction to stand and that this was an exceptional case, so did not create a 
precedent (Jenkins, 1966). 
 
Subsequently, in August 2000, Evans’s family were informed by the Home Office 
that they were to receive financial compensation, without admission of liability (Westlake 
[2004] 13). However, despite the free pardon and the compensation, Evans’s conviction 
stood and his half-sister Mary Westlake sought to appeal this. In fact, the quashing of his 
conviction was not enough for her – to rectify the harm and its legacy she sought a 
statement of his innocence from the courts, so that his exoneration could be complete 
(Westlake [2004] 37). An application was made to the CCRC but they refused to refer the 
case to the Court of Appeal. According to the Chairman of the CCRC Case Committee, 
notwithstanding the fact that ‘the quashing of the conviction would bring emotional 
solace to Mr Evans’s family’ and despite the fact that the conviction was accepted to be 
unsafe and there was a public interest in quashing unsafe convictions and even though a 
pardon did not quash a conviction, they decided that his royal pardon was enough as ‘the 
effect of a Royal [free] pardon is to establish the innocence of a convicted person and 
restore his reputation’. In addition, they looked to the public view of Evans and found that 
his conviction and execution were seen as a miscarriage of justice and that his pardon 
was taken as demonstrating his innocence (Westlake [2004]: 30). And they looked to 
‘public confidence in the criminal justice system’ – finding it ‘had already been restored 
in relation to this case’ because of the pardon – as well as to the costs involved in a 
reference (Westlake [2004] 17). So, in the CCRC view the harm (to Evans, to his family, to 
public confidence in the criminal justice system - and to the criminal justice system) was 
already removed in-so-far-as it could be.  
 
The High Court reviewed the CCRC decision in the Westlake case, finding no 
evidence of unreasonableness or unlawfulness (Westlake [2004]). It was also noted that 
it was not the role or even the practice for the courts to enter into discussions of 
innocence (as was noted above, the appellate criminal courts look at the ‘unsafety’ of a 
conviction, see Westlake [2004] 32, 36). So Evans’s conviction stood because he had 
already been pardoned, suggesting in terms of pardoning conventions that he was 
 
24 For example, see Kennedy, 1961. 
25 See, for example, Rubin, 2007: 54-5; Westlake [2004] 8-11. 
innocent (because innocence had been said to be needed for a free pardon). However, in 
this case Jenkins’s announcement of his decision was at least hesitant about any 
recognition of innocence. As a result, unlike Bentley’s family, for Evans’s some resolvable 
harm remains, with his family’s pain continuing (BBC, 2010).  
 
As the cases of pardoning considered above begin to suggest, and as the High Court 
has stated (Bentley [1994] 365) and Gerry Rubin has argued, royal pardoning is a ‘flexible’ 
device (Rubin, 2007: 58-59) and this can be an important factor in its ability to address 
harm. This means, for instance, that even the ‘supposedly tightly-circumscribed’ free royal 
pardons (Rubin, 2007: 58) have been granted when technical or moral innocence was not 
clear, as in the case of Evans. In addition, in Shields a free royal pardon was granted 
despite arguments as to whether this was legally possible under statute and in terms of 
international law. Moreover, royal pardons can be granted posthumously, despite 
previous arguments to the contrary. And from the Bentley and Shields legal cases it is 
evident that this ‘flexibility’ can be supported by the courts.26 Indeed, this ‘flexibility’ has 
increased in the second decade of the twenty-first century. 
 
Alan Turing has been described as the father of computer programming and he 
was a war hero; working at Bletchley Park he played a crucial role in cracking Nazi 
ciphers. However, in 1952 he was convicted of the homosexual offence of gross indecency 
in respect of his relationship with Arnold Murray, who was 19, and accepted chemical 
castration as an alternative to prison. He lost his job and ended up taking his own life in 
1954 (on Turing see, for example, Caroli, 2018: 501). A campaign to pardon him resulted 
in a petition of 37,405 signatures in 2009 (Turing Petition). The response was an apology 
from the Prime Minister Gordon Brown, which aimed to address the harm caused by his 
conviction and sentence: 
 
While Turing was dealt with under the law of the time, and we can't put the 
clock back, his treatment was of course utterly unfair, and I am pleased to 
have the chance to say how deeply sorry I and we all are for what happened 
to him. Alan and the many thousands of other gay men who were convicted, 
as he was convicted, under homophobic laws, were treated terribly. Over 
the years, millions more lived in fear of conviction. I am proud that those 
days are gone and that in the past 12 years this Government has done so 
much to make life fairer and more equal for our LGBT community. This 
recognition of Alan's status as one of Britain's most famous victims of 
homophobia is another step towards equality, and long overdue. (Brown, 
2009) 
 
So here we have an acknowledgement of technical guilt, perhaps to highlight the view 
that a free royal pardon would not be possible. There was a recognition of cruelty, of a 
climate of fear and, by implication, of the harm experienced by Turing and many others 
as a result of a cultural context which naturalised heterosexuality and rejected those who 
failed to fit in. Also, it is notable that Brown did not miss the opportunity to promote his 
Government’s record on LGBT issues.  
 
 
26 See especially Lord Justice Watkins in Bentley [1994] 365 
Following the apology, another petition was started in 2011 (BBC, 2011) but the 
idea of a pardon was rejected by Justice Secretary Lord McNally, ‘as Alan Turing was 
properly convicted of what at the time was a criminal offence’ (BBC, 2012). The matter 
was eventually resolved by the granting of a free royal pardon on the recommendation of 
Secretary of State for Justice Chris Grayling in 2013, despite Turing’s technical guilt – and 
here much was made of Turing as a war hero, portraying both Grayling and the 
Government in a particularly patriotic light.27 This was more than just ‘flexibility’, the 
criteria were totally rewritten, although the conviction stood, of course.  
 
So, what is revealed is the malleability of pardoning – even of a royal free 
pardoning, which was supposed to be the most rigidly confined form. Unsurprisingly, 
malleability is also seen in statutory pardoning. The Protection of Freedom Act 2012 
(sections 92-101) began to address the harm suffered by the many men who, like Turing, 
had been convicted in the past of what were by this time historic homosexual offences. 
But, in terms of nomenclature at least, this is not a pardoning statute. The 2012 Act makes 
it possible for an individual to apply for certain past convictions or cautions to be 
‘disregarded’. A disregard means that the person concerned is treated as if they had not: 
committed the offence; been charged with, or prosecuted for, the offence; been convicted 
of the offence; been sentenced for the offence; or been cautioned for the offence; and all 
the negative effects of the conviction or convictions are removed (for example, in terms 
of employment) (section 96). The process is free of charge28 and an individual can appeal 
to the High Court against a refusal to grant a disregard (section 99).  
In 2017 matters were taken further, with the passing of the Policing and Crime Act 
2017 (sections 164-167). In the words of the then Justice Minister Sam Gyimah, ‘This is a 
truly momentous day. We can never undo the hurt caused, but we have apologised and 
taken action to right these wrongs.’ (Ministry of Justice, 2017) The 2017 Act follows the 
same approach as the 2012 Act, so a pardon can only be granted if the other person 
involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented and was 16 or over and if the 
conduct would not now be an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(sexual activity in a public lavatory). Posthumous pardons were automatically granted 
where applicable (section 164), with cases reaching back to the late nineteenth century – 
Oscar Wilde was reportedly pardoned of some of his crimes. Indeed, estimates have 
suggested that tens of thousands of men have been posthumously pardoned by the 
measure (see for example, McCann, 2017). In terms of men who were still alive, the 2017 
Act meant that individuals who already had a disregard or disregards were pardoned in 
relation to that offence or those offences (section 165). In addition, anyone granted a 
disregard following the 2017 Act is simultaneously pardoned (section 165).29 And a 
failure to grant a disregard can be appealed to a court and a disregard now becomes a 
pardon, meaning that (indirectly) a failure to grant a pardon can be appealed. As a 
consequence, the courts have an appellate role in this mode of statutory pardoning30 as 
well as the ability to look into royal pardon recommendation decisions.  
A pardon granted as a result of the 2017 Act does not affect any conviction, caution 
or sentence, or give rise to any right, entitlement or liability. However, it also does not 
 
27 See Turing Pardon and Grayling, 2013.  
28 For information, the process and the application form see Home Office (a). 
29 As of April 2019, Home Office statistics reveal that 186 historic homosexual offences had been 
found to be eligible to be disregarded and thereby pardoned. Home Office, 2019. 
30 Although to date no appeals have been granted - Home Office, 2019 
affect the prerogative of mercy (section 167), nor prevent an attempt to bring an appeal. 
This all means that the remedy provided by this statutory pardon is again only partial and 
it is regarded as not being anywhere near enough by some; indeed, there is a good deal 
of anger at this approach to addressing these particular harms of the past, with 
suggestions a royal pardon would be preferable or that something else entirely is 
needed.31  
Thus far, pardoning has been portrayed as a broadly benevolent device (although 
there have been hints at other interpretations along the way) – it (sometimes) addresses 
and (at least partially) remedies harm. And a pardon undoubtedly has a great importance 
and a very real promise and effect for those who seek and obtain one – this should not be 
forgotten. However, of course, pardoning’s relationship with harm is more complex. Most 
significantly, the malleability discussed above is exercised by the powerful – by 
Parliament or a Secretary of State, who can seek advice but need not take it.32 Hence 
Jenkins’s ability to ignore the ways in which royal free pardoning was supposed to operate 
and pardon Evans. So pardoning decisions are exercises of power; as we saw above, 
pardoning is malleable - or perhaps biddable is a better word. In the light of this and 
building upon what has been argued already, pardoning’s plasticity needs to be 
reconsidered. Can the decisions to recommend and grant pardons discussed above be 
seen as being wholly about beneficence, for instance, or might we sometimes look to other 
reasons for a pardon? And how might a refusal or a reluctance to pardon be conceived?  
 
Because of the malleability of the pardoning device, as Rubin has pointed out, in 
recent times ‘politics’ can be brought into a decision as to whether to recommend a royal 
pardon (Rubin, 2007: 46, 57 and see Quirk, 2009).33 This is, of course, the case whether a 
royal pardon or a statutory pardon is at issue.  In some cases this might mean that a 
pardon is granted (one might point to the political benefits of popular pardoning, of being 
seen to support the LGBT community or restore the reputation of a war hero, for 
instance).34 Most starkly though, Home Secretaries have felt able to take into account the 
possible political effects of carrying out or failing to carry out an execution. This is most 
obviously seen in cases with links to Britain’s relationship with the island of Ireland and 
related political violence, including, for example, in the Roger Casement treason case 
(1916) and Coventry Irish Republican Army bombing case (1940), where the different 
predicted impacts on public opinion in the country and further afield were considered. In 
both instances the executions went ahead (see Rubin, 2007: 46, 57). Here the exercise of 
power, the malleability – or biddability - of a pardon takes on a much more sinister quality 
and, as a result, the criminal justice system is left to do its business and terminal harm is 
inflicted. 
 
Alongside this, a tendency to resist addressing criminal justice system harms, such 
as was seen in the decision not to refer Evans’s case to the Court of Appeal, is alarming 
but also unsurprising. Indeed, it is to be expected. Pardoning (and quashing a conviction 
or altering a sentence) in addressing harm also reveals and acknowledges criminal justice 
 
31 For example, actor Rupert Everett described Wilde’s pardon as a ‘last fart of British hypocrisy’, 
calling for an apology and compensation for his descendants as well as voicing disappointment that 
what was given was not a royal pardon but rather the less glamorous statutory device. 
32 See, further, for example, Rubin, 2007: 58-9. 
33 Historically, ‘[t]he power to pardon was overtly political’. Quirk, 2009: 649.  
34 And in relation to the Shields pardoning see Quirk, 2009; Bounds and Peel, 2009; Statement 
from the Justice Minister to the Financial Times, 2009. 
system unfairness, injustices and errors as well sometimes as wrongdoing on the part of 
criminal justice personnel.35 It can also mean that appellate judges are called upon to 
criticise a fellow judge, as in the executed Bentley’s successful appeal, something that they 
are extremely uncomfortable doing as the Court of Appeal judgment explained: ‘[i]t is 
with genuine diffidence that the members of this Court direct criticism towards a trial 
judge widely recognised as one of the outstanding criminal judges of this century.’ 
(Bentley [2001] 334) In this exposure and recognition, pardoning (and appeals) can harm 
by tarnishing the criminal justice system’s reputation, it can undermine public confidence 
and call the system’s legitimacy into question. But it is not just the criminal justice system 
which might be doubted as a consequence of a pardon (or appeal) - the harm done might 
be more far-reaching, touching upon the justice system as a whole, Government, 
Parliament. And, lest it be forgot, a reluctance to recommend or grant a pardon might also 
be affected by cost and floodgates concerns. With all this in mind it is worth recalling that 
one of the CCRC’s concerns in the Westlake application was to look not only at cost but 
also at whether public confidence in the criminal justice system had already been restored 
by the pardon. If it had been, then an appeal was not needed. Addressing harm to the 
system, therefore, seemed to be a priority here despite the ‘emotional solace’ which the 
CCRC acknowledged an appeal might bring to Evans’s family.  
 
More broadly, in terms of harmfulness, pardoning (and appeals) might be said to 
contribute to a harmful cultural context by only addressing a minority of the harms of the 
criminal justice system, doing so only partially and by generally leaving the system itself 
untouched (the Beck and Birmingham Six cases being amongst a few notable exceptions 
in that they led to some degree of wider change). In this context, pardoning might be 
described as harmfully reassuring. How might existing theory help develop this thinking? 
A first step might be to say that, adapting Palmer, pardoning is harmful because it creates, 
encourages or reinforces the view that all is well with the criminal justice system. In doing 
so it normalises favourable ideas about the system. It demonstrates that criminal justice 
system injustices and unfairnesses are rectified.  
 
More specifically, pardoning might be seen as harmful precisely in its benevolent 
flexibility (as opposed to the more rule-bound appellate system); in its shoring up of the 
criminal justice system; in the reassurance it might be said to offer that everything will 
turn out well in the end (although the end might take some time to reach and there is no 
guarantee that a pardon will be granted). In this way, pardoning casts the criminal justice 
system in an unjustified rosy hue. Its effect here is ultimately to distract and direct 
attention away from the injustices which a pardon addresses, along with other failures, 
abuses and unfairness in and of the system. And, perhaps particularly in the case of a 
royal pardon, its splendour blinds, one might say, the observer to the darker things that 
lie within the criminal justice system.  
Consequently, a pardon – an intervention from beyond the criminal justice system 
- supports the fiction of a fair (criminal justice) system, allowing harm to continue. It 
provides a scaffold for the notion that all is well with the criminal justice system, despite 
all the evidence that might suggest otherwise. Evidence which might be drawn, for 
example, from: the disproportionate use of stop and search in relation to BAME 
 
35 For an example of such wrongdoing in relation to pardoning, see Rubin, 2007: 46, 56. 
individuals; abuses of process revealed in appeals; the differential treatment of property 
crimes committed on the street from those committed in the suite; the continuing 
tendency to focus on bodily harms caused by conventional assaults rather than health 
and safety offences; and a failure adequately to deal with gendered violence. Moreover, 
pardoning frames criminal justice system mistakes as individualised anomalies, as 
unusual or exceptional cases, diverting attention from structural issues. In so doing, 
pardoning deflects attention from harm.  
Historic pardoning can have an added effect. It may sometimes serve to 
demonstrate that the present-day criminal justice system can recognise and address the 
injustices and unfairnesses (the harm) of the past, giving the impression that the criminal 
justice system is now fair. In this way, the present is normalised (and seen as fair), whilst 
the past is othered (as a time of injustice). So pardoning, however historic, tells us 
something about both the present and the past. However, sometimes there is a reluctance 
to officially acknowledge that a past system was unfair. In the case of the soldiers 
executed during the First World War the pardon recognised the men as victims of the 
war, not of the military justice system at the time (section 359 Armed Forces Act 2006). 
This is by no means entirely surprising as, despite changes including the abolition of the 
death penalty, the military justice system arguably remains largely the same as it was in 
the early twentieth century when it comes to the treatment of Forces personal who are 
perceived to be troublesome.36 And it remains a powerful force keen to protect its 




This article has begun to explore pardoning and harm in a zemiological vein. It is 
suggested that, at least in the context of pardoning, a general harm analysis is more 
productive than focusing merely on the harm caused by pardoning because in order to 
understand pardoning and harm one needs to take a broad view. For example, we have 
seen that pardoning does indeed sometimes recognise and partially resolve some forms 
of harm (and this is hugely important for the harmed), but there is also a reluctance to 
undo harm. Moreover, pardoning can also be culturally harmful in shoring up the criminal 
justice system.  
In terms of the analysis of pardoning, this article presents some early thinking. 
More work might be done investigating the recent history of pardoning. In addition, the 
relationship between pardoning and appeals is complex, evolving and warrants further 
thought from zemiologists. Beyond this, zemiological accounts of the recent history and 
current use of pardoning could revisit scholarship which has inquired into pardoning 
prior to the twentieth century.37 Comparative work would also be productive, looking at 
pardoning in other jurisdictions. In particular, a major gap in the analysis above relates 
 
36 A similar point was made by Piet Chielens (coordinator of the In Flanders Fields Museum in 
Ieper) at the AHRC Commemoration, Conflict and Conscience festival in Bristol, 2019 (for details 
of the festival see https://everydaylivesinwar.herts.ac.uk/ccc/). The treatment of conscientious 
objectors by the military in the First World War and the present arguably provides an illustration 
of this lack of change. See Bibbings, 2011. 
37 Which include, for example: Hurnard, 1969; Hay, 1975; Gatrell, 1994, especially pp 197-221; 
Lacey, 2009; Kesselring, 2009; King and Ward, 2015; Devereaux, 2017.  
to Ireland when it was part of the UK and Northern Ireland, including consideration of 
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